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The Cora Indians – or, in their own tongue, Naayari – are an Uto-Aztecan people native to the 
mountains of north-west Mexico who today number around 30,000 individuals. They earned a 
reputation as fierce fighters during the Colonial period, and held out against the Conquistadores 
until 1722, when their priest-kingdom was amongst the last of Mexico’s native polities to fall 
to Spanish forces. For a small people – who in the late nineteenth century numbered between 
three and five thousand individuals – the Coras have played an outsized role in Mexican history 
both at regional and national levels, thanks to their skill as guerrilla fighters, their relative unity 
as a people, and their determined efforts to preserve their cultural, territorial and political 
autonomy, often via strategic alliances with outside forces.  
 
To this end the Coras took part in the Mixtón war of 1532-42 between the Spaniards and an 
alliance of rebellious western Mexican tribes; held up the conquest of their homeland and 
nearby regions until the seventeenth century; and played an important regional role as insurgent 
fighters during the independence struggles of the early 1800s. Above all, however, this article 
will focus on the hitherto little-studied issue of Cora participation in the conflicts that wracked 
Mexico from the Liberal ‘Reform’ era of the 1850s, to the end of the Mexican Revolution in 
1920: a tumultuous period that saw wars between Conservative and Liberal factions of the 
national elite; between the nascent Mexican nation-state and the forces of Maximilian’s French 
empire; between a consolidated Liberal dictatorship and revolutionary insurgents; and, in the 
western Mexican state of Jalisco, between local elites based in the small trading city of Tepic 
(which lay close to the Cora homeland), and those of the state capital, Guadalajara, far away to 
the south. 
 
Although portrayed by nineteenth-century politicians, journalists and scholars alike as either 
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apolitical ‘savages’ isolated in their mountain strongholds,1 Cora fighters came to make up the 
backbone of the agrarian army of bandit-turned agrarian revolutionary Manuel Lozada. For 
reasons distinct from those of Lozada’s mestizo followers (whom historians have tended to 
uncritically lump together with the Coras to form a homogeneous, ‘agrarista’ mass),2 the 
support of independent-minded Cora communities for Lozada helped him carve an autonomous 
peasant republic out of northern Jalisco between 1854 and 1873, while concurrently helping to 
shape the course of the French Intervention in western Mexico from 1861-1867, and sowing 
the seeds for the separation from Jalisco of their homeland and the surrounding areas, which 
became a federally-administered military district. After Lozada’s final defeat and death in 
1873, some Coras switched sides and helped to prop up the local rule of the Liberal central 
government; while others took part in local uprisings that allowed their communities to keep 
hold of traditional landholdings in the face of Liberal reforms and the colonisation attempts of 
Spanish-speaking mestizo Mexicans.3 Finally, at the outbreak of the Revolution in 1910, a few 
Cora individuals joined the insurgent forces fighting to overthrow Porfirio Díaz. Their 
involvement – which, with the exception of this author’s own work, has been little examined 
by historians4 – paved the way for their more systematic participation in the civil wars between 
rival revolutionary factions that consumed the country between 1914 and 1920. At national 
level, this participation helped the Carrancistas to defeat their Villista enemies and cement their 
control over Mexico, and also won the Cora homeland and nearby regions the status of a new 
Mexican state, named ‘Nayarit’ after the Coras’ own name for themselves. 
 
Pagan Priest-Kingdoms and Cora Costumbre 
 
The Cora homeland – or ‘Sierra Cora’ – forms part of Mexico’s Sierra Madre Occidental 
mountain range. Spanning a total area of some 5,000 km2, it is located almost completely 
within Nayarit, making up nearly eighteen percent of the state’s total area, including some or 
all of the municipalities of El Nayar, La Yesca, Acaponeta, Huajicori, Ruíz and Rosamorada. 
The volcanic plateaus that dominate the region are overlooked by peaks that rise up to 3,340m 
above sea level, and are cut through by rivers whose canyons drop down to around 400m above 
sea level. Areas above 1000m are temperate, while at lower altitudes the prevailing climate is 
sub-tropical and often extremely hot. The climate also fluctuates between a wet season between 
June and September, and a harsh dry season that lasts from October until May.  
                                                 
1 González, Ensayo estadístico y geográfico de Territorio de Tepic, 560; Cambré, La Guerra, 496; see also the 
numerous articles attacking Lozada and his supporters in Le Trait d’ Union and Juan Panadero from the mid-
1850s onwards 
2 The best examples of this tendency can be seen in the work of Rendón: cf. Rebelión Agraria de Manuel Lozada 
and Manuel Lozada y las comunidades indígenas. A notable and comprehensive exception to this approach is to 
be found in the work of Regina Lira, who has recently carried out in-depth research into Cora and Huichol 
participation in Lozada’s movement, showing that their support cannot be separated from the ethno-cultural, 
ritual-political and historical idiosyncrasies of each people, and, indeed, of each of the numerous communities 
between which they are divided. Cf. Lira, ‘De Buenos mexicanos.’ 
3 In the Cora homeland and nearby regions, mestizos are primarily defined as all those local people who do not 
speak an indigenous language or take part in indigenous rituals. Other criteria by which Mexican mestizo identity 
can or should be judged vary from region to region, and are often controversial; for in-depth studies of Mexican 
‘mestizaje’ see Lomnitz-Adler, Exits From the Labyrinth; Bonfil, México profundo; Friedlander, Being Indian in 
Hueyapan 
4 cf. Morris, ‘Creating the World Anew,’ and ‘“¿Forjando Patria?” Las políticas del Estado revolucionario y el 




The Coras themselves are a people forged in war. During the early sixteenth century, in the 
context of the upheaval caused by the arrival of the Spaniards in what is now western Mexico, 
the Coras’ ancestors, previously divided between numerous smaller polities, united under the 
rule of a single politico-religious leader known as the ‘Tonatí,’ or ‘Rey Nayar.’ The inhabitants 
of this priest-kingdom included not only recalcitrant or apostate Indians from across western 
Mexico, but also escaped African slaves and renegade mulattos and Spaniards.5 Although 
neither Catholic missionaries nor Spanish soldiers were permitted to enter the Tonatí’s 
kingdom, which remained independent of Spanish rule until 1722, his subjects traded in salt 
and livestock with the inhabitants of nearby coastal regions, and some worked seasonally in 
the mines of Durango and Zacatecas.6  
 
As a result of such contacts, the Tonatí’s people became adept at blacksmithing and raising 
(and raiding) cattle, horses and mules, and also began to adopt elements of the Catholic faith 
into the framework of their own customary practices (which they refer to, in Spanish, as 
costumbre).7 However, the Cora priest-kingdom was ultimately held together by resolutely 
non-Christian costumbre, including ritual dances called mitotes practiced at the level of both 
descent-groups and entire communities; faith in the power of ancestors and pre-Hispanic gods; 
cyclical conceptions of history; and a belief that shifting subsistence agriculture, hunting, and 
gathering were sacred activities in which all ‘real people’ – that is, the Coras and their 
indigenous neighbours, the Huichols, Tepehuanos and Mexicaneros – were obliged to 
participate. Throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, mass mitote ceremonies – 
which at this point featured human sacrifice – were overseen by the Tonatí at La Mesa, which 
became the focal point of a ‘centralized political and religious tradition’8 uniting a population 
organised at a lower level into clans or descent-groups defined – as they continue to be today 
– by blood-ties and participation in family-level mitotes (which coincide with the stages of 
both the agricultural year and the human life cycle).9 Although the military capacity of this 
unified population was key to their resistance to Spanish attempts to conquer them, Colonial-
era missionaries and soldiers preferred to use geography to explain the continued independence 
                                                 
5 Coyle, From Flowers to Ash, 75 
6 Neurath, Las fiestas, 21, 
7 Hinton, ‘Pre-Conquest Acculturation,’ 166 
8 Coyle, From Flowers to Ash, 82 
9 Jáuregui, Los coras, 12 
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of the Tonatí’s kingdom,10 describing the region as ‘furious and horrible… It is not even 
possible to ride horseback in this country as the abruptness of the terrain is hard on the horses 
and the steepness of the slopes frightens the horsemen.’11  
 
As mentioned above, the Cora priest-kingdom was the last Indian kingdom in Mexico to fall 
to Spanish forces, two centuries after the conquest of the Aztec empire.12 However, even after 
Jesuit missionaries congregated the conquered Coras into missions at Jesús María, La Mesa, 
Santa Teresa, San Juan Peyotán, San Juan Corapan, Rosarito, Huaynamota, and San Pedro 
Ixcatán, they continued to practice pan-communal rituals that facilitated the political and 
military cohesion of the Cora population as a whole.13 Within each of the new mission 
settlements – some of which doubled as Spanish military garrisons – the cults of statues of 
Catholic saints – known as santitos – were also absorbed into Cora costumbre.14 Even after the 
Coras returned to their dispersed ranches following the expulsion of the Jesuits from Mexico 
in 1767, they continued to use the missions and their churches ‘as ceremonial and assembly 
centres.’15 By the late eighteenth century, the Coras thus possessed ‘a half-digested Christianity 
but a well organised and functioning civil-religious hierarchy,’16 which held together their 
disparate descent groups and diverse, autonomous communities in the absence of the 
centralised rule of the Tonatí. This allowed them to continue to mobilise effectively against 
external threats, often ‘taking advantage of the disputes between Spanish authorities to 
establish inter-ethnic and also inter-class alliances,’ as demonstrated by wholesale Cora 
partipation in wider regional rebellions in 1723, 1724, 1758, and 1801.17 
 
The Mexican War of Independence and the Rebellion of Manuel Lozada 
 
Less than a hundred years after the conquest of the Tonatí’s kingdom, the outbreak of the War 
of Mexican Independence in 1810 provided the Coras with yet another opportunity to use their 
skills as guerrilla fighters to claim autonomy for themselves and their communities. The 
majority of the Cora population supported regional pro-independence forces, and although a 
Franciscan royalist did his best to organise the defence of the Sierra, he was soon forced to flee 
the region in the face of the Cora insurgents’ superior numbers.18 More than a decade of local 
fighting followed this early defeat, during which both the royalist and pro-independence sides 
employed guerrilla tactics during six-month campaigning seasons that, in line with Cora 
costumbre, started not in October, with the harvest, but rather in November, after ceremonies 
that rendered the corn crop edible had been celebrated. The local campaigning season 
meanwhile ended at the beginning of the rains, in May, when the Sierra became impossible for 
Royalist cavalry to negotiate. For the Coras, rituals also defined the timings of military 
offensives, and shaped preparations for raids, or measures to defend communities from raiders. 
Even the directions in which civilians fled from their attackers were informed by older routes 
of pilgrimage, which linked the communities of the Sierra Cora to the sacred caves and forest 
groves that now became the hideouts of Cora families. 
  
Royalist forces, in order to survive in the harsh terrain of the Sierra, and, they hoped, cut off 
                                                 
10 Coyle, ‘The Customs,’ 516 
11 Ortega, in ibid. 
12 Gerhard, La frontera Norte, 142-5 
13 ibid., p.147; Gómez, ‘Huicot,’ 138 
14 Hinton, ‘Indian Acculturation,’ 22 
15 Coyle, From Flowers, 85 
16 Hinton, ‘Indian Acculturation,’ 22 
17 Lira, ‘De buenos mexicanos,’ 7 
18 Jáuregui, Magriñá, ‘Estudio etnohistórico,’ 64-6 
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supplies to their enemies, focused their energies on ‘confiscating all of the grain which the 
Coras had stored… and capturing their cattle.’19 But Cora fighters saw off such threats by 
‘making a fearful noise and launching a rain of rocks and arrows down upon the soldiers, after 
which they vanished.’20 The use of rocks and boulders as weapons of war is, of course, as 
ancient as war itself, and has been used to great avail by guerrilla forces across the world; 
perhaps most famously in the Battle of the Roncevaux Pass in 778, when, as commemorated 
in the medieval ‘Chanson de Roland,’ Basque guerrillas obliterated the rearguard of 
Charlemagne’s Imperial army as it passed through their territories. Such tactics remained 
extremely effective in the mountainous Cora homeland – especially against outsiders who were 
unaccustomed both to the local terrain and the rigours of guerrilla warfare – and Cora fighters 
continued to use them with success throughout the rebellion of Manuel Lozada, and into the 
twentieth century.  
 
In 1821, thanks in large part to the support of indigenous groups like the Coras, the insurgents 
finally won the day against the Spaniards and established the new, independent nation of 
Mexico in place of the Spanish colony of ‘New Spain.’ But the defeat of royalist forces did not 
mean that the Coras would return to their previous status as supposedly ‘conquered’ Indians. 
Instead, Cora participation in local uprisings and their canny political manoeuvring in the 
context of national-level conflicts between Liberals and Conservatives for control of the young 
nation allowed them to prevent government officials and Catholic priests alike from asserting 
control over their communities.21  
 
In particular, Cora support for the revolutionary movement of mestizo peon-turned-bandit chief 
and agrarian reformer Manuel Lozada – who ruled the area that is today the state of Nayarit as 
an independent peasant republic between 1853 and 1873 – allowed the Coras to continue to 
maintain their political and religious autonomy into the 1870s. Thus they were able to avoid 
the most deleterious effects of the mid-century Liberal Reform Laws, which, seeking to create 
a nation of prosperous smallholders from a country still dominated by corporations, mandated 
the division and distribution of communal and Church-owned lands, opening up traditionally 
Indian territories across Mexico for purchase by speculators and large landowners. 
 
Manuel Lozada rose to power on the back of his opposition to these reforms, which garnered 
him widespread popular support throughout the Seventh Canton of Jalisco. From humble 
beginnings as a bandit, in 1856 Lozada gained political prominence through an alliance with a 
Conservative faction of the commercial elite of Tepic, the Seventh Canton’s capital city. In 
exchange for helping these Conservatives in their fight against both the Liberals of Tepic and 
those of Jalisco’s state capital, Guadalajara, they kept Lozada well supplied with cash, arms 
and powder, and ‘capitalised on the discontent of the Cora communities… which they 
channelled into a struggle for the defence of the conservative national project that began to take 
shape during those years.’22 
 
However, Lozada and his local followers – made up of mestizos and Cora and Huichol Indians 
– proved more independent-minded than their new Conservative allies had envisaged. Lozada 
followed perfectly the trajectory of the social bandit as outlined by Hobsbawm – ‘outlaws 
whom the state regards as criminals, but who are considered by their people as heroes, as 
champions, avengers, fighters for justice, perhaps even leaders of liberation,’ and who, in 
                                                 
19 Santoscoy, Colección de documentos, 62 
20 ibid., 63 
21 Coyle, From Flowers to Ash, 88 
22 Lira, ‘De buenos mexicanos,’ 11 
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societies resisting the ‘encroachments and historical advances of central governments… may 
even be helped and supported by the local lords.’23 As well as attacking Liberal militias and 
federal troops, Lozada helped his followers take back territory lost due to the Liberal Reform, 
and to defend other lands threatened by these same laws; in the Sierra Cora, Lozada’s support 
enabled a ‘multitude of indigenous rebels’ to attacked mestizo colonists who had begun to seize 
Cora lands around the community of Jesús María. They killed some of them, forced the rest to 
flee the region ‘in the greatest misery,’ and took the local priest prisoner, on the grounds that 
he had encouraged mestizo settlers and tried to curb Cora religious autonomy.24 In response to 
these and numerous other perceived ‘outrages,’ Federal troops and Jalisco’s state militia 
intervened in the late 1850s on behalf of landowners attacked by Lozada’s supporters, whom 
they pursued them deep into the mountains of the Sierra Cora. The sudden appearance of 
government soldiers in their homeland only increased Cora support for Lozada. In 1858, the 
comisario municipal de San Juan Peyotán reported that all of the Cora communities, without 
exception, ‘have declared in favour of “the wicked Lozada.”’25  
 
Cora guerrillas proved an invaluable addition to Lozada’s forces. Their hit-and-run tactics 
terrified government forces struggling to penetrate the ‘rocky and heavily forested terrain’ of 
the Sierra.26 Just as they had done a few decades before, during the struggle for Mexican 
independence, Cora fighters responded to the Federals’ bullets and futile artillery barrages with 
primitive but effective weapons such as boulders: ‘The cyclopean rock, the enormous mass of 
granite, is detached, using levers, from its socket… and flies, pushed by unseen hands, 
knocking down horses and not stopping until it reaches the foot of the mountain, clotted with 
blood and splattered brains.’27 They also used fire against their enemies to great effect, taking 
advantage of the aridity of the Sierra during the local campaigning season, which coincided 
with the driest months of the year. The Mexican novelist Mariano Azuela, in a short story based 
on his reading of reports on Lozada’s rebellion, describes in terrifying detail a night-time 
ambush of government forces, during which Cora guerrillas set alight the scrub surrounding 
their enemies’ camp. As the flames lit up the darkness of the mountains, bullets flying amidst 
the panicked men and burning horses, one survivor reminisced that ‘no eramos gente, señor, 
sino demonios en el infierno.’28 
 
Frustrated by these attacks, as well as by ‘the apathy and lack of cooperation of the inhabitants 
of the Canton,’29 Lozada’s enemies demanded that Jalisco’s state congress authorise their 
complete destruction of Lozada’s main strongholds – including several of the Cora 
communities of the Sierra – and the dispersal of all their inhabitants, ‘who in their totality are 
composed of bandits who have desolated the Canton, sowing death, dishonour, misery and 
terror and every class of the post punishable iniquity throughout.’30 The congress refused, 
however, and in autumn 1857 Jalisco’s Liberal leaders agreed a truce with Lozada, according 
to which his supporters – no longer classed as ‘bandits’ but as ‘indigenous rebels,’ the change 
of tone reflecting the change of government strategy – were to give up their arms, in exchange 
for individual pardons and Guadalajara’s pledge to ‘carry out the measuring, surveying, and 
demarcation of the lands of the haciendas of this Canton, in virtue of the question of territory 
                                                 
23 Hobsbawm, Bandits (London, 2000), 20 
24 Lira, ‘De buenos mexicanos,’.21 
25 ibid. 
26 Meyer, Manuel Lozada, 239 
27 Ibid 220, 239 and 331 
28 ibid., 223 quoting Azuela, ‘El Hombre Masa,’ 409-10 
29 AHJ, Seguridad Pública, Rocha to Parrodí, 2 Oct. 1857 
30 Ibid. 
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being the cause of this uprising.’31  
 
Jalisco’s Liberals refused to offer Lozada himself an amnesty, however, and instead condemned 
him for causing ‘a scandal infringing the law and offending the most basic moral principles,’ 
and for committing ‘crimes of all kinds at multiple junctures and without any political 
project.’32 Lozada therefore remained under arms, and soon threw himself and his supporters 
into the new conflict between Liberal and Conservative elites – the ‘War of Reform’ – that 
broke out a few weeks later. Lozada and Carlos Rivas – the scion of an elite Conservative 
family in Tepic and Lozada’s second-in-command – ‘organised in the Sierra, the valleys and 
the lowlands the contingents that would make up the Conservative forces in the Seventh 
Canton.’33 Just like contemporary Yeke warlords of Central Africa described elsewhere in this 
volume – who in the 1870s took advantage of an alliance with Portuguese traders to found an 
independent state in Congo’s Katanga region34 – Lozada’s supposedly ‘backward’ followers 
owed much of their political and military success to their homeland’s incorporation into global 
trade networks, which had enabled a clique of regional families, ‘organised around the 
commercial interests of the Barrón y Forbes trading house of Tepic,’ to amass sufficient wealth 
to fund Lozada’s insurgency.35 But the support of so many Coras for Lozada enabled Liberal 
journalists and politicians to condemn his cause as a ‘caste war’ that aimed at the ‘destruction 
of the white race,’ building on Colonial ideas of the mountains of Nayarit as a remote and 
impenetrable bastion of savagery.36  
 
However, while dismissed as an outburst of ‘barbarism’ by Mexico’s Liberal elites, regarded 
by the nation’s Conservative leaders and their wealthy partisans in Tepic as a local extension 
of their own movement, and represented more recently by many historians as the near 
spontaneous uprising of a disaffected and homogeneous ‘indigenous peasantry,’37 the rebellion 
of Lozada and his supporters – grouped together as ‘the United Pueblos of Nayarit’ – was in 
fact a far more complex affair. In aiming to restore to the Seventh Canton’s formerly influential 
peasant communities the lands and political and religious autonomy they had lost to Liberal 
reforms, it was more than just another outburst of rural discontent: as scholars such as Meyer 
have shown, it was in fact a movement whose declared political goals outlined an alternate 
model of state-formation for elites seeking to create a new Mexican nation from the ground 
up.38 Rather than seeking to destroy the country’s indigenous and peasant communities, and 
their traditions of local rule and direct democracy, Lozada’s political model envisaged these 
corporate entities as the building blocks from which the new nation could be fashioned. In line 
with this model, Cora support for the movement was harnessed under one of their own: 
Dionisimo Gerónimo, a Cora warlord from La Mesa, the old capital of the Cora priest-kingdom. 
Gerónimo acted as the chief politico-military leader of a league of autonomous Cora 
communities, internal control of which was shared by elderly ritual specialists, middle-aged 
                                                 
31 AHJ, Seg. Púb., Convenios de Paso de Caimán, 15 Nov. 1857 
32 Ibid. 
33 Lira, ‘De buenos mexicanos,’ p.21 
34 cf. Giacomo Macola, ‘Guerrilla Warfare in Katanga: The Sanga Rebellion of the 1890s and Its Suppression’, in 
this issue 
35 Lira, ‘De buenos mexicanos,’ 21 
36 Quevedo y Zuvieta, México, 140; see also Van Oosterhout, ‘Popular Conservatism,’ 221-2 
37 cf. A. Aldana Rendón, Rebelión Agraria de Manuel Lozada; Rendón, Manuel Lozada y las comunidades 
indígenas; Rugerio, ‘La Revuelta Agraria de Manuel Lozada y la Separación de Tepic.”  
  
 
38 cf. Esperando a Lozada; Meyer, La Tierra de Manuel Lozada Vol. IV: Colección de Documentos para la 
Historia de Nayarit; Meyer, Manuel Lozada 
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members of directly democratic cargo-systems governments, and communal ‘military 
commands’ headed by ‘Indians named by Lozada.’39 All of these assorted political and military 
authorities were furthermore subject to the overall, centralised control of a single ‘governor of 
the Indian territory’ elected once a year, on 15 January,40 a system legitimised by the 
development and formalisation of complex internal, and also inter-communal, ritual practices. 
 
Although Cora participation in the ‘United Pueblos’ movement ‘implied subjecting themselves 
militarily to Lozada’s General Command in [the lowland village of] San Luis, and politically 
to its political captaincy in Tepic,’ the recent work of Regina Lira demonstrates that the Coras’ 
own internal politico-military organisation in many ways echoed arrangements in the Sierra in 
the late eighteenth century, when each Cora community had fielded a militia that answered to 
a central military command in Jesús María. During the Lozada era, each of the Cora 
communities continued to contribute its contingent to a combined Cora militia force, 
maintaining ‘a list of men old enough and in good enough physical condition to fight, ten 
percent of whom remained always at arms, according to a system of rotation that guaranteed a 
minimal but permanent mobilisation, as well as the entire contingent’s familiarity with military 
practices.’ Each community also took care of feeding its militia, and ensured they were well-
armed with ‘a lance, sword, machete, dagger, pistol and rifle.’ The only difference was that 
now, the Cora militias were organised around two military commands: one, as before, in Jesús 
María, with a second established in Dionisio Gerónimo’s stronghold of La Mesa, each of which 
was overseen by a council ‘composed of a military commander who functioned as president, 
and two subordinate captains who served as secretaries.’41 
 
Between late 1857 and late 1860, Lozada and the United Pueblos battled for control of the 
Seventh Cantón against Liberal guerrillas led by Lozada’s nemesis, Ramón Corona. Although 
at local level the latter found it impossible to overcome ‘la enormous resistance… offered by 
the mountainous terrain he trod and the warlike race he tried to subjugate,’42 by the end of 
1860, the war had been won at national level by the Liberals, who took power in Mexico City 
and installed Benito Juárez as President of the Mexican Republic. In the Seventh Canton, which 
Conservative leaders had earlier declared independent of Jalisco in exchange for Lozada’s 
support, Lozada proclaimed his submission to the Liberals and looked to sign an armistice with 
Juárez and his new government. He had demonstrated little real ideological attachment to the 
Conservative cause beyond a shared antipathy to the Liberals, to whom he was nevertheless 
now willing to claim fealty; his real interest lay in maintaining his influence in the Seventh 
Canton, now in a limbo between independence and re-incorporation.  
 
However, Lozada refused to give up his weapons, while the new, Liberal Governor of Jalisco, 
Pedro Ogazón, refused to acknowledge any directives issued in the Seventh Canton before the 
Liberal victory. Negotiations between the two sides quickly broke down, and in February 1861 
Ogazón declared that anyone who did not immediately and unconditionally submit to his 
government would be ‘considered as bandits’ and ‘irrevocably shot at the moment of their 
apprehension,’ while ordering the forces he sent to the region, composed of five thousand 
men,43 to completely destroy Lozada’s strongholds and distribute their property amongst their 
neighbours.44  
                                                 
39 ‘Periódico Oficial 1878,’ in Meyer, De cantón de Tepic, 158 
40 Alicia Hernández Chávez, ‘Lozada no muere,’ in ibid., 211 
41 Lira, ‘De buenos mexicanos,’ p.23, citing Meyer, Manuel Lozada, 240-241; 251-254 
42 Quevedo y Zuvieta, México, 65 
43 Lira, ‘De Buenos Mexicanos,’ 22 
44 ABPE, Colección de leyes y decretos de Jalisco, 1860-61, 20 
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There followed another year of harsh warfare in the Sierra Cora. The anti-Lozada tradition 
consistently ignores the savagery of the Liberal campaign, as outlined by Ogazón’s above 
decree, or bandit-turned-Liberal commander Antonio Rojas’ plan to invade the Cora homeland 
and ‘not leave before exterminating this accursed race of bandits… and throw from their homes 
these Indians and push them into the neighbouring states.’45 Even these measures could not end 
the war in the Seventh Canton decisively for the Liberals, ‘“unable to land the decisive blow 
because the Indians roam from hill to hill.”’46 But it was only after the arrival of French, British 
and Spanish troops near Veracruz early in 1862 that they agreed to negotiate with Lozada’s 
forces.  
 
The ostensible aim of the foreign expeditionary force was to collect on unpaid debts that 
Mexico had racked up during the War of Reform; but before long the French decided to mount 
a full-scale invasion of the troubled republic, in order to establish in its place a profitable 
monarchical protectorate – the so-called ‘Second Mexican Empire’ – under an Austrian prince, 
Maximillian of Hapsburg. In the face of this new threat to Liberal power, General Ogazón met 
with Lozada, who, in clear acknowledgement of his cause’s coherent local political and socio-
economic objectives, agreed to demobilise his forces in exchange for an amnesty for his 
supporters, and the formation of a new, neutral Canton-wide government, which would ensure 
‘the defence of the Indians in territorial conflicts with the neighbouring landowners.’47  
 
Despite this treaty, however, Liberal attempts to return the Seventh Canton to Guadalajara’s 
control continued. Lozada’s arch-enemy, Ramón Corona, moved large numbers of troops in 
and out of the region, while positions in the new Cantonal authority were given to Lozada’s 
old Liberal opponents, who enacted a plan to colonise the Sierra Cora with armed American 
settlers.48 These would be given land and other economic incentives in exchange for their 
‘service against the Indians when thus required by the nation’s government.’49 In the midst of 
the French intervention at national level, but faced with the potential of a rather more 
threatening foreign invasion on his own doorstep – that of American settlers committed to 
destroying the Coras – Lozada was forced to accept that the Liberals had reneged on their treaty 
commitments, and in August 1863 instead recognised as Mexico’s legitimate government the 
Emperor Maximilian and his French backers, who were now ensconced in the interior of the 
country.  
 
During the five years of war between Maximilian, French expeditionary troops and 
Conservative forces on one side, and Benito Juárez and his Liberal loyalists on the other, the 
Sierra Cora served as a ‘zone of refuge, rearguard actions and guerrilla warfare.’ Various Cora 
communities were raided by Liberal militias under the command of Ramon Corona.50 Such 
attacks prompted the ever more direct participation of Cora guerrillas within ‘the military 
forces of the Seventh Canton… as part of the Imperial Auxiliary Troops of Maximilian… 
receiving five-year salaries and temporary discharges during sowing and harvest times.’51 But 
testament to his supporters’ concerns for local, rather than national, issues, Lozada paid little 
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attention to French requests for active armed support, and instead concentrated on defeating 
Corona, taking Tepic, and reasserting order in the Seventh Canton. He remained the master of 
his own kingdom, pursuing his own agenda, which his ostensible superiors within the French 
expeditionary forces had no choice but to accept (a policy that, as described by Mario Draper 
elsewhere in this volume, influenced the attitudes of both French and Belgian forces in their 
African wars of conquest in the ensuing decades).52 Thus General Felix Douay, the senior 
French officer in the west of Mexico, pragmatically refused to interfere in Lozada’s running of 
the Seventh Canton (which had been officially severed from Jalisco by the new government), 
admitting that ‘General Lozada is not sufficiently subservient to my actions for me to be sure 
that my orders will be carried out.’53 
 
Lozada engaged politically with the Imperialists just as he did militarily – when it suited him. 
Thus it was only in 1865 that he sent his most trusted aide, Carlos Rivas, to Mexico City; his 
objective was to establish the Seventh Canton permanently as the independent and sovereign 
state of Nayarit, and to approach Maximilian about the issues that had dominated Lozada’s 
struggles since 1857 – land and indigenous autonomy. An agreement was made: Nayarit was 
declared a new Department, separate from Jalisco, and the process of communal territorial 
demarcation was set to begin immediately, the task falling to a committee under the authority 
of the Ministry of Public Works.54 Such contacts between Lozada and Maximilian likely 
influenced the latter’s interest in and sympathy for indigenous issues, which the next year 
resulted in his passing a wealth of other national-level legislation designed to protect Indian 
communal lands, and other laws that ‘conceded relative liberty to peons, and lands to the 
indigenous communities that lacked them.’55 
 
However, despite the Imperial government’s support, Lozada was too politically adroit to 
continue in his adherence to Maximilian’s cause after Napoleon III abruptly withdrew French 
military support in late 1866, and it became clear that the course of the civil war had turned 
and the Liberals were likely to triumph. Lozada slowly disassociated himself from the 
Imperialists, declaring, on 1 December 1866, the ‘Act of Neutrality of the pueblos of Nayarit.’ 
After suffering a series of defeats throughout early 1867, Maximilian was captured by Liberal 
forces in May and, the next month, was executed along two of his top generals, Miramón and 
Mejía. However, Lozada, having freed himself and his followers from any commitments to 
either of the warring national parties, continued to control a swathe of western Mexico, and 
began the last phase of his career, as the independent cacique (‘political and/or military boss’) 
of Nayarit. 
 
Several years of peace in Nayarit followed, during which time Lozada stepped up the 
redistribution of lands, and his Cora supporters set about further institutionalising their 
political, cultural and territorial autonomy through the creation of new civil-military authorities 
within their communities, whose legitimacy was bolstered through the invention of new ritual 
practices. With the death of President Juárez in July 1872, however, Lozada’s position again 
became precarious. Internal differences within his ever-heterogeneous political movement – 
which included feuds between rival pueblos as between rival chiefs – manifested themselves 
with the rebellion of Andres Rosales and Praxedis Núñez, two of Lozada’s lieutenants, who 
took with them a thousand men and the town of Atonalisco. After Lozada defeated them 
militarily, they fled to the protection of Corona, and would prove instrumental in their former 
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leader’s eventual downfall. At the same time, with Lozada’s protector in Mexico City gone, 
Liberal elites in Guadalajara and Tepic seized on the opportunity to change the Supreme 
Government’s attitude towards affairs in the Seventh Canton, publishing a glut of damning and 
openly racist local dispatches in the national press. ‘Here there has triumphed at last the 
huarache [a pejorative term for ‘Indian,’ after their leather sandals],’ reported the Liberal 
newspaper Juan Panadero from Tepic; ‘the entire local government is composed of ignorant 
unknowns… and the hacendados are still being robbed of their property. Various families are 
fleeing.’56 
 
As a result, Lerdo declared that Lozada’s strongholds must submit themselves to the 
constitutional order, with Lozada’s government replaced with the authority of a jefe político 
named by the Supreme Government, and all questions of land boundaries passed to official 
tribunals, ‘without that practiced by [Lozada’s] commissions taking place.’57 He also ordered 
the movement of state militias from Zacatecas and Sinaloa to Guadalajara, where they joined 
forces sent from Colima and Jalisco in anticipation of an attack on Lozada’s strongholds. In 
response, Lozada and his compatriots made the decision to go to war with Lerdo’s government 
at the traditional new-year meeting of all of Nayarit’s Lozadista communities, with a first strike 
launched from the sierra viewed as preferable to waiting to be attacked. On 17 January Lozada 
proclaimed his ‘Plan Libertador’ (‘Programme of Liberation’) to the nation, calling for, 
amongst other things, the abolition of the land taxes, the governance of the nation by sovereign 
municipal governments chosen via free elections, and the formation of a council made up of 
three representatives from each state, again named via free and direct elections, who would 
decide ‘what form of popular representation to give the nation, whether with the character of 
republic, empire or kingdom, as long as that chosen allows for the nation’s true aggrandizement 
and a lasting peace.’58 
 
As Lozada’s forces took Tepic and then marched towards Guadalajara, the ‘Plan Libertador’ 
was essentially ignored by the regional and national press, which preferred to condemn 
Lozada’s movement on the grounds of the supposed savagery of the Coras and other indigenous 
peoples of the Sierra who supported him. Thus Juan Panadero printed a plea to the government 
of Jalisco, ‘that you take the necessary precautions, so that the appalling tendencies of the 
Indians are not increased,’ without any mention of any political plan whatsoever.59 And J.M. 
Vigil, in a front page editorial in el Siglo XIX, wrote of ‘these savage tribes of Álica amongst 
whom there does not exist even the shadow of individual rights, nor the most remote façade of 
respect for the interests of society,’ and characterised the conflict as the ‘crusade of civilisation 
against the most disgraceful barbarity,’ without a single reference to the openly declared goals 
of Lozada and his supporters, Cora and mestizo alike.60  
 
For around a century afterwards, such Liberal propaganda defined interpretations of Lozada 
and his movement; for history is written by the victors, and on 28 January 1873, Lozada was 
defeated by Corona at La Mojonera, at the gates of Guadalajara. His primarily guerrilla forces 
were poorly trained and ill-equipped for a conventional battle against a fortified defensive 
force, and were routed with heavy losses. His movement shattered with the weight of the blow 
and Lozada was forced back into the Sierra Cora, where his dwindling forces faced off against 
‘10 mil soldados dirigida por tres secciones que penetraron la Sierra de Nayarit por rumbos 
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distintos.’61 As the months went by, he was abandoned by one after another of his chiefs, 
including, finally, Dionisio Gerónimo and his Cora fighters. After several more months of 
pursuit, Lozada was eventually captured, taken back to Tepic, and executed. President Lerdo 
appointed a Jefe Politico (political chief )in his place, although in much of what had been the 
Seventh Canton – now officially a Federally-administered ‘Military District’ named for its 
capital, Tepic – Lozada’s former lieutenants remained the paramount local authorities.  
 
Lozada lost more than just a battle at La Mojonera; he lost a war of words that had raged since 
1857. To many today, Lozada remains a traitor who sold himself to the French; he is never a 
marginalised campesino rising up in the name of the exploited, both indigenous and mestizo, 
against unfair Liberal reforms. Perhaps the charge of treachery stands; but if Lozada was a 
traitor to Mexico, he was never a traitor to his real homeland – for he stayed true to the pueblos 
of Nayarit, and above all to the Coras. What use had they for a newly created nation that had 
already declared them obsolete? What was siding with the French to a people threatened by 
armed American settlers hired to carry out a genocide in the Sierra?  
 
Thus in the Sierra Cora today, Lozada is still venerated by local people, associated with Jesus 
Christ and believed to have been betrayed and killed by ‘Jews’ not in Jerusalem, but in Mexico 
City; while many of the Coras’ Huichol neighbours also associate Manuel Lozada with ‘the 
promethean deer god Kayumarie.’62 Furthermore, although after the fall of the Second Mexican 
Empire most of the indigenous groups that had supported Maximilian and the French – such as 
Sonora’s Opata people – were crushed militarily and lost nearly all of their remaining lands 
and political autonomy,63 Cora support for Lozada, followed by their defection to the 
government side at the last minute, allowed their communities to retain their de facto political 
and territorial autonomy into the late nineteenth century. Not a single Cora appears to have 
been involved in litigation with a hacienda during the Lozada era, suggesting that, unlike most 
of the mestizo communities that supported Lozada, his Cora followers had successfully 
managed ‘la recuperación de sus territorios de las manos de los vecinos desde los sucesos de 
1858.’64 Meanwhile, after Lozada’s death, Cora leader Dionisio Gerónimo remained the Sierra 
Cora’s chief politico-military authority, charged by the federal government with keeping the 
local peace and ensuring that his compatriots abstain from active rebellion against the Liberal 
order, in exchange for federal non-intervention in local issues. 
 
Part 3: The Porfiriato 
 
The support of the Cora communities for Manuel Lozada had not only allowed them to expel 
mestizo settlers from their territories, but also made the application of early Liberal ‘reform 
laws’ in the Sierra del Nayar impossible. New pressures were unleashed on the region after 
Porfirio Díaz overthrew President Lerdo in November 1876 and established a new Liberal 
regime, which developed into a durable military dictatorship that lasted until it was overthrown 
during the Mexican Revolution in 1911. However, despite the backing of Díaz’s regime for the 
division and privatisation of communal lands in the Territory of Tepic, which was one of the 
ten entities most affected by the disentailment of communal lands during the Porfiriato,65 
continued Cora recalcitrance, together with the difficulties of transport and communication 
presented by the rough terrain of the region, continued to obstruct the surveying and dividing 
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of Cora communal lands.66 Thus the Cora communities escaped largely unscathed, with the 
exception of San Juan Peyotán, which was fully colonised by mestizos.67  
 
Similarly, although ‘auxiliary courts’ were set up in each community to represent the Porfirian 
state, these were either ignored by the Cora population, or alternatively their judges ‘obeyed in 
all respects the community’s [Cora] governor,’68 having been integrated into existing Cora 
authorities ‘through strange ceremonies.’69 Throughout the Porfiriato, then, each Cora 
community retained its control of large tracts of land, as well as a high level of cultural and 
political autonomy from the state. The Coras remained fiercely defensive of this fact: the 
Norwegian explorer Carl Lumholtz, who visited the Sierra in the late nineteenth century, noted 
that, in general, the Coras had ‘very strong objections to unions with [mestizos],’70 while 
contemporary ethnologist Konrad Preuss reported that ‘who do not wish to know anything of 
the outside world,’ describing the Coras as ‘haughty subjects, who handle weapons very well 
and whom one does not wish to bump into in the mountains.’71 And although the Porfirian state 
by now regarded the Sierra Cora as ‘pacified territory,’72 and Lumholtz and various other 
foreign visitors, in line with the positivism and social Darwinism that dominated contemporary 
views of indigenous societies,73 predicted that the Coras would soon become culturally and 
racially extinct,74 the Czech doctor and anthropologist Ales Hrdlicka was ultimately correct 
when he noted that the Coras had ‘not given up the thought of armed resistance’ to the threats 
that outsiders posed their lands, cultures and ways of life.75 
 
 
Part 4: The Revolution 
 
 
In October 1910, after fraudulent elections in which Porfirio Díaz won a landslide victory, 
dissident political leader Francisco I. Madero issued his ‘Plan de San Luis Potosí,’ urging the 
nation to rise up against the dictatorship on 20 November. Across the country, peasants, workers 
and members of the provincial middle classes answered Madero’s call, setting in motion the 
Mexican Revolution. The uprising soon reached the mountains separating Durango and 
Zacatecas from the then-Federal Territory of Tepic. Although in response an expeditionary 
force of cavalry and rurales set out from Tepic for the Sierra Cora, ‘with the object of protecting 
those distant pueblos and avoid the invasion that the rebels of Durango and Zacatecas might 
carry out,’76 it failed to achieve its objectives. Rebel forces took the Sierra and marched on 
Tepic itself, which fell to Maderista forces in May 1911, without a shot being fired.77 A few 
days later Madero and Pascual Orozco defeated the Federal army at Ciudad Juárez, and forced 
President Díaz from power. 
 
However, the power-hungry Pascual Orozco soon revolted against Madero, and was seconded 
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in Tepic by an ex-Federal Lieutenant, Miguel Guerrero, who raised a force that raided along 
the western edge of the Sierra Cora.78 Guerrero then joined forces with Camilo Rentería in 
Huaynamota, in the Sierra Cora itself,79 and together the rebels attacked Tepic on 29 April. 
Although they were repelled with losses – to the extent that the Federal commander claimed 
that Rentería himself had died in the battle80 – the city’s elite were alarmed by the sudden 
appearance of a rebel army at their gates, and the Cámara Nacional de Comercio de Tepic 
warned President Madero that:  
 
‘this city does not possess a sufficient garrison of federal soldiers commanded by a 
skilful military chief… [given] the threat posed by the numerous armed subversives 
and the Indians of the Sierra… It is well known that the intention of ex-Lieutenant 
Guerrero is to take control of Tepic and gather together here the elements necessary to 
then attack the city of Guadalajara, and we invoke the unfortunate memory of the 
chieftain Lozada, to remind you of the damage that a resolute man can cause the nation 
once he has taken Tepic.’81 
 
Although references to Indian rebellion had long been used by the elites of both Tepic and 
Guadalajara to tarnish political opponents like Manuel Lozada,82 and to elicit Federal 
intervention in local disputes by invoking the spectre of a Yucatan-style ‘caste war,’83 the 
Cámara’s appeal probably also reflected the real presence of Coras from the area around 
Huaynamota amongst Rentería’s troops. And just as the memory of Lozada remained a byword 
for the dangers of Indian rebellion amongst Tepic’s elite, so too it seems likely that those Coras 
and Huichols who decided to join Rentería – himself a descendent of one of Lozada’s 
lieutenants – were encouraged to do so by memories of their former successes under Lozada.84 
 
The fears of Tepic’s elite were soon confirmed, for news of Renteria’s death proved premature, 
and it transpired a month later that the rebel leader was in fact alive and well and back in 
Huaynamota at the head of two hundred fighters.85 Rentería and Guerrero’s forces skirmished 
with Federal troops throughout the summer, and by July the number of ‘bandits’ active in the 
Territory had reached more than eight hundred men.86 The use of the term ‘bandit’ by the 
authorities to disparage revolutionary forces was common throughout Mexico in this period, 
but it is important to note that many early revolutionary leaders – including such major figures 
as Emiliano Zapata – had much in common with Hobsbawm’s figure of the ‘social bandit’, and 
often struggled to form cohesive social movements from the even more ‘bandit-like’ local 
rebels who formed the backbone of their forces.87 In the Sierra Cora, the depredations of the 
latter turned local people against Rentería, and, angered by Rentería’s attempts to levy ‘forced 
loans’ on them, attacked his men and forced them to flee the region in disarray.88  
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In February 1913, over the course of the ten days known as the Decena Trágica, President 
Madero was deposed and then assassinated by his foremost military chief, General Victoriano 
Huerta. Revolutionary military commanders and reformist statesmen including Venustiano 
Carranza, Francisco ‘Pancho’ Villa, Emiliano Zapata and Álvaro Obregón turned their arms on 
Huerta and eventually defeated his Federal army in July 1914. However, tensions then grew 
between Carranza and Obregón on one side, and Villa and Zapata on the other. A new civil 
war soon broke out between the rival revolutionary factions. After Villa was heavily defeated 
in the Bajío in spring 1915, some remnants of his dispersed army took refuge in the Sierra 
Cora, pursued by Carrancista forces. This development served to further increase contacts – 
both friendly and hostile – between the Coras and armed outsiders, and paved the way for the 
local establishment of Carrancista-armed self-defence militias, which, according to one rather 
disapproving observer, transformed ‘savages with bows and arrows’ into ‘savages with 
carbines and mausers.’89 In turn, this led to the rise of a new generation of Cora leaders who 
can be defined, according to Alan Knight’s cacical grading system, as bottom-level, local (or 
even sub-local) ‘caciquillos,’ some of whom survived the revolution to emerge, in the 1920s, 
as higher-level ‘municipal’ or even ‘regional’ caciques.90 
 
Some Cora Defensas were formed after the Carrancistas occupied a community, met with the 
traditional authorities, charged them with selecting a suitable leader or picked one out from 
amongst them, and made them responsible for organising a militia. In other cases, regional 
Carrancista commanders lent official recognition to pre-existing Cora paramilitaries, on 
condition they pledged their allegiance to Carranza. The Carrancistas would then hand over 
whatever arms they could spare (generally bolt-action cerrojo rifles), although there were often 
fewer weapons than needed, and many Defensa members initially armed themselves with bows 
and arrows, slings, machetes, or the ever-versatile coa digging stick. As in other peripheral 
regions of Mexico, the size of the Cora Defensas varied from five to more than forty members,91 
and often grew or shrank according to the availability of weapons, the severity of external 
threats, and the value of the prizes to be won through armed action.92 
 
Those who ended up heading the Defensas, whether elected by their communities or hand-
picked by the Carrancistas, tended to be young men able to mediate between their communities 
and the outside world. Given the long histories of contact between the Coras and the regional 
mestizo population, and the way in which the shamanic practices of the former often required 
individuals to take on multiple contradictory identities, there were always a few Indians in each 
community able to act simultaneously as ‘Indian and mestizo’.93 In a few cases, these men 
were themselves mestizos, albeit with close ties to the local Cora majority. If they had some 
military training, their command of a Defensa was all the more authoritative; so much the better 
if they were wealthy (in this period synonymous with cattle ownership), and therefore had the 
means to supply some of a Defensa’s material needs, and more to lose from Villista raids.  
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The Defensas of the Sierra Cora played an important part in Carrancista efforts to combat 
remnant Villistas and generalised banditry in the Territory of Tepic. After Carranza elevated 
the Territory to the category of a ‘Free and Sovereign State’ in January 1917 – named Nayarit 
after the Cora endonym, Naayari94 – they consolidated their power through an alliance with 
the new state’s governor, General Jesús M. Ferreira. By early 1919, when General Francisco 
de Santiago seized power in Nayarit,95 de facto control over the entire Sierra Cora lay in the 
hands of two Carrancista-aligned Defensa commanders: Mariano Mejía and Eutimio 
Domínguez.  
 
Domínguez was a full-blooded Cora born in 1882.96 His father was also a native of San Juan 
and a relatively wealthy rancher, while his mother, according to some accounts, was originally 
from San Francisco – reflecting the strong links of trade, kinship and ritual which still linked 
together the different Cora communities. Domínguez seems to have been an early participant 
in the revolution in Nayarit, eventually returning home with a wounded knee (which would 
never fully heal, forcing him to spend most of the rest of his life on horseback),97 and the rank 
of Colonel in Carranza’s Constitutionalist army.98 There he established a Defensa to defend 
both his community, and his father’s cattle, from the raids of the ‘bandidos’ then active in the 
area.99  
 
After his father’s death in one of these raids, Domínguez inherited what was left of his herds.100 
This enabled him to sponsor ceremonies that increased his status within the descent-groups 
groups that he belonged to, while his status as a ranking military officer, and his command of 
a well-armed Defensa, limited the opposition of rival families or factions to his increasing 
influence in San Juan and neighbouring communities. He not only appeared to his Cora 
compatriots as ‘one of us’, but also as a natural leader possessed of supernatural powers. He 
was known to spend much of his time fasting and praying to his community’s santitos, ‘so that 
nothing would happen to his men.’ Thanks to Domínguez’s asceticism, the five devoted 
bodyguards who always surrounded him in battle were reputed to have been practically bullet-
proof, their white cotton shirts and trousers ‘all shot full of holes, but not even a scratch on 
their bodies.’101  
 
However, Domínguez also spoke good Spanish, had learned to read and write while in the 
army, and his intellect would later impress SEP officials, who rather patronisingly described 
him an ‘Cora Indian of relative culture.’102 Like other indigenous caciques in this period, from 
Oaxaca to Michoacán, he used his literacy, charisma and military prowess to successfully 
negotiate the violent and alien world of revolutionary mestizo politics, while also playing up 
his ethnicity in order to present himself as a ‘noble Indian’.103 Thus Domínguez acted as a 
bridge between Coras and outsiders, allowing him to consolidate his influence over the rest of 
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the Cora Baja – whose communal Defensas Rurales were all under his control by 1920 – while 
simultaneously developing his clout with the state government, which would later come to 
depend on him to harness the collective military potential of the Coras during the first Cristero 
rebellion. 
 
Domínguez’s friend and then-ally Mariano Mejía was an even more powerful figure. Unlike 
the Cora Domínguez, Mejía was born 1879 in increasingly ‘mestizoised’ Huaynamota,104 and 
oral sources agree that his mother was a local ‘Indian’,105 and his father a mestizo rancher. 
Although unable to speak the Cora language,106 and despite traditional Cora distrust towards 
mestizos, Mejía nonetheless managed to become one of the many ‘white and mestizo ethnic 
brokers’ to raise a powerful and predominantly Indian force during the Revolution,107 and by 
1920 he represented Carranza’s government throughout the entirety of the Cora Alta and 
beyond into neighbouring parts of Durango and Jalisco.108 
 
Mejía had been orphaned while still a young boy, after ‘revolutionaries’ – most likely ex-
Lozadista rebels – killed his father, and his mother fled the community.109 Mejía’s uncle, a 
priest, adopted the boy and took care of his education,110 which allowed him to become, like 
Domínguez, one of the few literate natives of the Sierra Cora at this time. Mejía arrived in Jesús 
María some years before the outbreak of the Revolution, after his uncle was sent there to serve 
as a parish priest. Mejía was able to use the inheritance left him by his late father to buy cattle 
and set himself up as a rancher.111 His herds increased rapidly, and he became a rich – and thus 
influential – local figure, hiring Coras and mestizos from across the region to work on his 
ranch,112 and thus establishing patron-client ties with his neighbours.113 He also married a Cora 
woman and established Catholic-style ritual kinship ties with other Coras through the 
institution of compadrazgo.  
 
As a rich and literate local mestizo who also commanded the respect of many Coras, Mejía had 
huge potential to become a ‘revolutionary’ cacique in the serrano tradition,114 while his 
extensive herds would have been natural targets for the Villista bands roaming the Sierra. It is 
not surprising, then, that at some point during the revolutionary upheaval,115 Mejía obtained 
arms from the Carrancistas for himself and eleven men – probably selected, as usual, from 
amongst his peons, in-laws and compadres116 – to set up a local militia.117 Only after he had 
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actively demonstrated his loyalty to the Carrancistas, however, was Mejía able to extend his 
authority beyond his base in the Jesús María region. According to local interviewees, at some 
point during the revolutionary civil war a rebel leader called José Gallegos, most likely a 
Villista from Zacatecas, took refuge in the Sierra Cora.118 However, the Constitutionalist 
authorities in Tepic soon heard of his presence, and ordered Mejía to assassinate him. Mejía 
accordingly invited Gallegos to join his Defensa in a raid on ‘bandits’ supposedly hiding out in 
the forests around Santa Teresa, and then betrayed and murdered him as they ate lunch in the 
mountains.  
 
The versions of this story told by Mejia’s grandsons, Juventino Mejía Rivera and Enendino 
Escobedo Mejía, attribute supernatural powers to Gallegos, who was rendered invincible by a 
huge tattoo of a devil across his back. It was only after Mejía and his men ‘cut off the skin with 
a knife, all that had the devil on it, that Gallegos then finally began to die.’119 Although it is not 
surprising that Mejía’s descendents should exaggerate the powers of Gallegos – and thus of the 
famous forebear who managed to dispatch him – the other details of their stories, such as the 
cruelty of Gallegos’ murder, are typical of many local tales of the revolution and the 
Cristiada.120 Meanwhile, the mythical elements of the story – and the way in which having 
vanquished Mejía is said to have taken on the dead Villista’s powers121 – fit within a well-
documented Latin American tradition of attributing supernatural qualities to influential 
leaders,122 which in turn served to bolster their charismatic power and further legitimise their 
authority.123 In Mexico, Emiliano Zapata is the most famous example of how such processes 
of mythification and mystification function,124 but much the same could also be said of Eutimio 
Domínguez, and, more importantly, of Manuel Lozada, to whom many older Coras and 
Huichols still attribute supernatural powers.125 
 
Even discounting the similarities between the supernatural tales told about Mejía and Lozada, 
it seems clear enough that the general precedent set by the latter must have helped boost local 
acceptance of Mejía’s influence some fifty years later. Just as Lozada, aided by his Cora 
lieutenant Dionisio Gerónimo, had overcome traditional Cora antipathy towards mestizos to 
rise to power over the entire Sierra Cora, so too Mejía was helped by a Cora compadre, León 
Contreras, to rise from commanding eleven men in Arroyo de Santiago, to controlling the 
Defensas of every Cora and mestizo community in the Cora Alta. His influence even extended 
beyond state lines as far as Huazamota and San Lucas in Durango,126 and San Andrés in 
Jalisco;127 which, significantly, were also the only communities outside of the Territory of Tepic 
to sign Lozada’s 1870 political manifesto,128 further reflecting the parallels between the two 
men’s careers and spheres of influence. Nugent has noted the ‘importance of popular forms of 
historical memory and their strategic deployment in political struggle’ during the revolution,129 
and it would seem that Mejía successfully tapped into Cora memories of Lozada’s ‘Popular 
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Conservative’ rebellions so as to unite them against the bandits and Villistas who now 
threatened their communities, just as Mejía’s contemporaries elsewhere in Mexico mobilised 
their own indigenous clients through similar references to their forebears’ participation on the 
Liberal side during the Wars of Reform.130 
 
The ability of Mejía and Domínguez to establish themselves as paramount authorities in the 
Sierra Cora no doubt owed much to the prior existence of a centralised politico-military 
command amongst the Coras, both during the rule of Lozada, and in the era of the Rey Nayar. 
In turn, by calling together all of the Defensas of the Sierra Cora to undertake larger-scale 
military operations, Mejía and Domínguez boosted their effectiveness as military commanders, 
and thus the strength of their claims to legitimate military and political authority over the region 
and its inhabitants.  
 
Using the same guerrilla tactics that had made them such effective fighters during Lozada’s 
rebellion and many other, previous conflicts – and, in addition to the occasional cerrojo rifle, 
weapons such as bows and arrows, machetes, boulders, and the careful use of fire to burn their 
enemies out of their strongholds or sow panic amongst them during night-time ambushes131 – 
they were not only able to defend their communities against raiders, but also played an 
important role in Francisco de Santiago’s pacification campaign in Nayarit in 1919 (to the 
extent that Mejía was on first name terms with the general). Their alliance with the Revolution’s 
‘winning side’ won the cacical regimes of Mejía and Domínguez the state government’s full 
recognition.132 And their unifying influence not only helped to strengthen the Coras’ collective 
ability to defend themselves, but also impeded the outbreak of internecine conflicts that might 
otherwise have fractured the bonds between their communities. This brought to the region a 
level of political stability that local people initially welcomed after the chaos of the early years 
of the revolution.  
 
However, although the emergence of the Cora Defensas, and the rise of their commanders to 
political importance, had important conceptual and historical antecedents, local war leaders of 
previous eras had tended to recede into the political background once the immediate military 
threat had passed. Many of the Cora Defensa-commanders-turned-caciques of the 
revolutionary period, however, were reluctant to give up their newfound power and growing 
wealth even after the threat of Villista raids began to fade. From 1919, as their original raison 
d’être ebbed, the Sierra Cora’s Defensa commanders sought to preserve their status by entering 
into increasingly close alliances with the emergent revolutionary state. In response, popular 
resistance to their authority grew, engendering factional conflicts throughout the region’s 
communities, and locally validating Knight’s general judgement that ‘the only good cacique is 
– if not a dead cacique – at least a short-lived cacique.’133 
 
 
Part 5: Epilogue  
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Although their struggles are less well known than those of the Yaqui, between 1850 and the 
early 1920s the Coras successfully used guerrilla operations and tactical alliances with outside 
forces to defend their lands from rapacious hacendados, their political independence from 
expansionist statesmen, and their culture from the pressures of mainstream, mestizo society. 
Cora fighters, whether aligned to the pro-independence cause, or to Manuel Lozada, or to the 
Carrancistas, shared similar objectives and were united by strong, ritually-defined, political-
military ties between their communities, but were also able to move quickly and effectively 
through the mountainous and heavily forested terrain of their homeland in small groups, giving 
them an important advantage over their less mobile enemies, who were usually less 
knowledgeable about the local landscape and less adept at guerrilla fighting.  
  
At all three of these important junctures in Mexican history, collective memories of the priest-
kingdom that existed in the Cora homeland until the early eighteenth century, filtered through 
a worldview that stressed the power of supernatural forces in every aspect of life, helped Cora 
communities to mobilise militias that would defend them against their enemies. Such tactics 
allowed the Coras to maintain a high level of autonomy compared to most of Mexico’s other 
indigenous groups well into the twentieth century, and also had consequences for the nation as 
a whole: for instance, Cora participation in Manuel Lozada’s rebellion led directly to the 
creation of state of Nayarit; helped the French to hold onto swathes of western Mexico even as 
they faced defeat in the country’s interior; influenced Emperor Maximilian’s indigenous-rights 
and agrarian policies; and cemented Maximilian’s Liberal successors’ beliefs in the inherent 
danger that Indian autonomy posed the nation-state. Later Cora backing for the Carrancistas 
during the Revolution meanwhile helped the latter establish their control of Nayarit, defeat 
their Villista rivals at national level, and, it had become clear by the mid-1930s, sowed the 
seeds for the eventual decline of the Cora communities as politically autonomous entities, even 
as it won their lands some level of protection from rapacious major landowners and small-time 
mestizo colonists alike. 
 
The fact is that the growing power of militia commanders in the Sierra Cora, in the context of 
the concerted state-building efforts of successive revolutionary regimes between 1920 and 
1940, served to undermine both the internal stability of the Cora communities and the political 
and ritual ties that had long existed between them. Most Cora military leaders turned out to be 
willing to sacrifice some of their autonomy in exchange for territorial protection and personal 
political and economic advantage; a trade-off that was fiercely resisted by conservative Cora 
factions, giving rise to internecine conflict throughout the Sierra in the late 1920s, during the 
Cristero rebellion. However, the defeat of the conservatives by their better-armed, better-
supplied ‘cosmopolitan’ enemies ensured that the Cora homeland would finally become an 
indissoluble part of the Mexican nation-state.  
 
Thus in the face of changing national-level conditions, the same Cora militarism that had once 
propped up their political autonomy, ended up undermining it. Comparisons can thus be made 
between the Cora paramilitary organisations of the early twentieth century, and many of the 
indigenous militias that emerged elsewhere in Latin America from the 1950s; for example, the 
Peruvian rondas campesinas (‘peasant patrols’). These played an important part in defeating 
the country’s Maoist ‘Shining Path’ guerrilla movement, but also pursued communal, factional 
and personal agendas, and their leaders evolved into powerful warlords, giving rise to factional 
tensions and social conflicts in the areas in which they were active.134 
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However, although the Sierra Cora of today is far from the priest-kingdom of the Tonatí, or 
even the autonomous league of indigenous republics that flourished under the regional rule of 
Manuel Lozada, neither is the Cora homeland as integrated into Mexico as the mid-nineteenth-
century’s Liberals, or their Carrancista successors, would have wanted. Thanks to historical 
Cora resistance and continued recalcitrance, the presence of the state in the region remains 
weak, and its representatives are primarily coercive forces – like the odd army battalion hunting 
for opium plantations – or part of agencies offering cash transfers, donations of food or 
blankets, and offers of political support to the Cora communities on condition that they send 
their children to schools where they can be transformed into ‘Mexicans’ through education.  
 
Meanwhile Cora traditional governments and agrarian authorities remain influential within 
their communities, which continue to hold their lands collectively – anathema both to Liberal 
conceptions of ‘civilised’ land tenure and ‘modern’ political organisation. Meanwhile, although 
most Coras have now abandoned the idea of protecting their autonomy via active warfare 
against the state, they continue to employ Scottian ‘weapons of weak’ – including ‘foot-
dragging, noncompliance, evasiveness, and obfuscation,’ and the selective use of their language 
as a code135 – to defy the demands and expectations of outsiders such as government officials. 
Indeed, within the context of the current Mexican ‘Drug War,’ some of the Cora youth are 
winning back their forebears’ reputation as ‘dangerous’ and ‘wild’ Indians, through their active 
participation, whether voluntary and involuntary, in the international narcotics trade, both in 
terms of the production of opium, and, increasingly, the trafficking of this and other drugs north 
towards the US. Thus the pursuit of autonomy through the negotiation of alliances with 
potentially threatening outside forces – whether this entails taking up arms against the state, or 
abandoning defeated caciques and fighting for the state – has at the very least allowed the Coras 
to defy the predictions of nineteenth century statesmen and explores alike, that ‘these primitive 
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